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A Note from the Editors:
In 1970, Congress enacted Title X, which authorizes the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to make grants to public and private organizations
for the operation of family planning projects. According to one estimate, Title
X projects provide services to an estimated 14.5 million women; of these
women, nearly one third are adolescents, and 90% have incomes below 150%
of the poverty line.
When Congress enacted Title X, it stipulated that no Title X funds "shall
be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." While it
is clear that the statute never permitted Title X funds to be used to subsidize
or perform abortions, the government permitted Title X recipients to provide
abortion counseling.
On February 2, 1988, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
finalized regulations that reversed the prior policy of permitting the discussion
of abortion. In addition to prohibiting employees in Title X-funded clinics from
discussing abortions with clients, the new regulations require that recipients
physically separate their Title X clinics from their activities that involve
abortion counseling or advocacy.
The same day that the regulations were finalized, Dr. Irving Rust, the
medical director of a Planned Parenthood center in the Bronx, filed suit in
federal district court seeking to block implementation of the regulations. Dr.
Rust claimed that the regulations violated the First and Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution and the legislative intent of Title X. Dr. Rust was joined in his
lawsuit by Planned Parenthood and other health care providers that receive
Title X funds.
The district court upheld the regulations and held, among other things, that
the prohibition on abortion counseling did not violate Dr. Rust's First
Amendment rights. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court, and the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case.
Debevoise & Plimpton was chosen by NOW to write one of a limited
number of amicus briefs to the Supreme Court. NOW asked the authors of the
brief to focus primarily on the impact of these regulations on women,
especially low-income women, teenagers, and women of color.
The Yale Journal of Law and Feminism signed on to NOW's amicus brief,
and is now delighted to publish a brief of such critical importance to women.
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INTEREST OF AMiCI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund
and 117 organizations which share a common concern for the protection of
women's rights, and in particular the fundamental right to reproductive
autonomy, necessary to fulfill the Constitution's promises of liberty and
equality for all. These organizations, representing millions of individual women
and men from diverse backgrounds, have joined together to urge this Court to
grant the relief sought by Petitioners and permanently enjoin the Title X
regulations at issue. They believe the regulations profoundly impede exercise
of the fundamental right to reproductive decision making essential to the health
and the lives of the millions of low-income women who are served by federally
funded family planning clinics. (Further statements of interest of amici are set
forth at Appendix A.)
Amici have the consent of the parties to file this brief. Letters of consent
have been filed separately with this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Title X regulations at issue prohibit abortion counseling and require
referral for prenatal care only, and thus impermissibly burden women's
constitutionally protected right to reproductive decision making. That
unconstitutional burden translates into concrete risks to the health and the lives
of poor women-a disproportionate number of whom are young women and
women of color-who are served by Title X clinics.
Under the guise of encouraging childbirth, the regulations prevent women
seeking help at Title X clinics from receiving complete and unbiased medical
advice about reproductive options. The ban on abortion information puts at risk
the health and the lives of pregnant women, particularly those for whom
complicating physical conditions make abortion a critical medical option. The
regulations thus affirmatively interfere with a woman's constitutionally pro-
tected decision, informed by her physician, of whether or not to carry her
pregnancy to term. The regulations also impermissibly infringe the basic first
amendment right of the women served by Title X clinics to receive accurate
reproductive health information from their health care providers. Finally, the
regulations deprive women of equal protection under the law because they
discriminate on the basis of gender and do so in a way that implicates a
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woman's fundamental right to choose abortion and to receive information
essential to informed reproductive health care.
The governmental purpose in enacting the regulations-to encourage child
birth by curtailing access to information about abortion and abortion servic-
es-and the regulatory scheme devised to effect that purpose cannot survive
strict scrutiny. The scheme cannot even stand as a rational means to achieve
the government's purpose, given that the regulations both contravene the aim
of Title X to promote public health and mandate violations of accepted medical
practice.
Amici respectfully urge this Court to reject, as it has in the past, this
blatant attempt to interfere with constitutionally protected reproductive
decisions.
ARGUMENT
I. THE REGULATIONS UNDULY BURDEN A WOMAN'S FUNDAMENTAL
PRIVACY RIGHT TO MAKE INFORMED REPRODUCTIVE DECISIONS FREE
FROM UNWARRANTED GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE.
The regulations prevent the women served by Title X clinics from freely
and independently deciding whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term, as is
their right under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and cases following Roe.
By suppressing all mention of abortion while simultaneously compelling
referral for prenatal care, the regulations impermissibly intrude into the
physician-patient dialogue concerning reproductive options.' Through the
funding mechanism, they create significant obstacles to the constitutionally
protected right of women seeking health care at Title X clinics to decide, with
the necessary information at their disposal, whether or not to carry pregnancies
to term.
The Court has recognized that if the sphere of "liberty" guaranteed under
the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is to "extend[]
to women as well as to men," women must have the autonomy to decide
whether and when to bear children, Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986), and to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into "matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child," Eisenstadt
1. The regulation's ban on abortion counseling and referral affects not only women who are already
pregnant, but also women using Title X family planning services for non-pregnancy related needs. See
infra p. 35 and note 30.
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v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W.
4957, 4961 (U.S. June 25, 1990) & 4968 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-318 (1980); Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 687 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965) (White,
J., concurring). Absent the right to decide whether or not to terminate a preg-
nancy, the freedom to make the child-bearing decision would be hollow.2
Recognizing that a woman needs medical advice to decide whether or not
to continue a pregnancy, the Court has carefully protected the physician's role
in the woman's decision making process. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447 (1983). Because her
decision is "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision," Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973), and "an important and often a stressful one," Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976), it is "desirable
and imperative that [the decision] be made with full knowledge of its nature
and consequences," Id. Only by providing pregnant women with all the
medical facts that bear upon the decision, can physicians assist women to make
informed reproductive choices about one of the most important decisions in life.
For all women, pregnancy entails "profound physical, emotional and
psychological consequences." Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.). For many women, pregnancy, labor
and delivery pose significant medical risks, particularly when cesarean sections
account for one out of four deliveries. See D. Danforth, M. Hughey & A.
Wagner, The Complete Guide to Pregnancy 228-31 (1983). The medical risks
2. Because of advances in modem medicine, no bright line can be drawn between the decision to
abort and the decision not to conceive. Both oral contraceptives and the intrauterine device operate after
fertilization. See R. Hatcher, E. Guest, F. Stewart, J. Trussell, S. Bowen & W. Cates, Contraceptive
Technology 252-53, 377 (14th rev. ed. 1988). Moreover, no method of birth control is 100 percent
effective. See Jones & Forrest, Contraceptive Failure Rates in the United States, 21 Fam. Plan. Persp.
103 (1989). The failure rates for contraceptives used for a 1-year period are as follows: the Pill - 6.2%;
the condom- 14.2%; the diaphragm - 15.6%; the rhythm method - 16.2%; and spermiicides - 26.3%.
Id. at 109. A study of women who had abortions in 1987 revealed that 51.3% had been using a
contraceptive method during the month in which they became pregnant. Henshaw & Silverman, The
Characteristics and Prior Contraceptive Use of U.S. Abortion Patients, 20 Fain. Plan. Persp. 158, 167
(1988).
Furthermore, because of the high risks of sexual violence, no woman of child-bearing capacity is
safe from an unwanted pregnancy. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports
for the United States 6, 13-15 (1987) (In 1987, one forcible rape every six minutes); N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28, 1987, at B5, col. 1 (113,000 cases of child sexual abuse reported in 1985); S. Apeton,
SexualAssault Among Adolescents 130-34 (1983) (very high incidence of date rape among adoles-
cents); D. Finklehor & K. Yllo, License to Rape: Sexual Abuse of Wives 6-8 (1985) (estimating
10-14% of all married women experience marital rape).
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associated with carrying pregnancy to term should not be underestimated: of
every ten women who experience pregnancy and childbirth, six are treated for
some medical complication and three are treated for major complications. See
R. Gold, A. Kenney & S. Singh, Blessed Events and the Bottom Line:
Financing Maternity Care in the United States 10 (1987).
In comparison, legal abortion is safer than childbirth. Less than one
percent of all abortion patients experience a major complication associated with
the procedure. See The Alan Guttmacher Institute, Abortion and Women's
Health: A Turning Point for America? 32 (1990). At eight weeks of gestation
or earlier, the risk of death from abortion is about 20 times lower than that of
childbirth; at no point during pregnancy is abortion more dangerous than child-
birth. See LeBolt, Grimes & Cates, Mortality from Abortion and Childbirth:
Are the Populations Comparable?, 248 J. Am. Med. A. 188, 191 (1982).
As the primary source of federal support for family planning and
reproductive health services, funding over 3,900 clinics nationwide, Title X
served 4.3 million low-income women in 1988, with a target population con-
sisting of an estimated 14.5 million women at risk of unintended pregnancy,
including 5 million adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19. Note, The Title
X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional
Rights?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 401, 408 (1989) (collecting sources). Thirty percent
of these women are women of color, see The Alan Guttmacher Institute,
Organized Family Planning Services in the United States 1981-1983 28, 30
(1984), and eighty percent have incomes below 150 percent of the poverty line,
see Declaration of Dr. Stanley Henshaw, Deputy Director of Research, The
Alan Guttmacher Institute, 18 (194JA).3
The right to make informed decisions concerning reproductive health care
is particularly important for low-income women served by Title X. The
communities in which they live suffer from disproportionately high rates of
teenage pregnancy and a myriad of diseases (high blood pressure, hypertension,
diabetes, cancer, sickle cell anemia and AIDS) that increase the risks associated
with pregnancy. 4 Pregnant teenage women are twenty-four times more likely
3. Citations to the Joint Appendix that accompanies the Petitioners' Briefs are made to the page
number therein as "(_JA)." Citations to the appendix that accompanied the petitions are made to the
page number therein as "(_a)." Citations to the Joint Appendix filed in the Second Circuit are made
to the page number therein as "(_A)."
4. See generally M. Rudov & N. Santangelo, Health Status of Minorities and Low-Income Groups
(1979). The AIDS epidemic has particularly severe consequences for these communities. A recent study
predicts that by 1991, AIDS will become one of the five leading causes of death among women in the
child-bearing years nationwide. Chu, Buehler & Berkelman, Impact of Human Immundeficiency Virus
Epidemic Mortality in Women ofReproductive Age, United States, 264 J. Am. Med. A. 225 (1990). The
racial disparities uncovered by the study are dramatic: in 1988, AIDS killed nine times as many black
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to die from childbirth than from a first trimester abortion. Carlson, Abortion's
Hardest Cases, Time, July 9, 1990, at 22, 25. Black women, disproportionate-
ly represented in low-income communities,5 are nearly three times more likely
to die from complications of pregnancy or childbirth than are white women.
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Health: United States 1989, at 33
(1990).
By prohibiting any mention of abortion, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8(a)(1)-(4)
(1989), the Title X regulations deprive low-income women of full health care
counseling and information critical to their reproductive decision making and
treatment. Section 59.8 of the regulations forbids practitioners in Title X clinics
from informing their patients either of the availability of abortion or where
abortion-related information can be obtained. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989).
Even when women request information about abortion, they may be told only
that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family
planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion." 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.8(b)(5) (1989). Furthermore, the regulations do not simply censor abor-
tion-related speech: they require that pregnant women be given a list of health
care providers "that promote the welfare of mother and unborn child." 42
C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1989). This referral list must include all available prenatal
care providers that do not perform abortions, and it cannot include any health
care providers that offer abortion as their "principal business." 42 C.F.R. §
59.8(a)(3) (1989).
While the government may implement "a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion ... by the allocation of public funds," Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977), it cannot, absent a compelling justification, place
"obstacle-absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an
abortion." Id. By altering medical counseling through withholding information
concerning abortion and prescribing information designed to cause women to
carry to term, the regulations erect significant obstacles to women's reproduc-
tive decision making, hidden but nevertheless very real to the women served
by Title X. The regulations' intrusion into the physician-patient dialogue
impermissibly crosses the line between "state encouragement of an alternative
women as white women. Id. at 226. AIDS is already the leading killer of black women of child-bearing
years in New York and New Jersey. Id. at 227.
Pregnancy both accelerates the course of AIDS in a child-bearing woman and poses a 30-50% risk
that her newborn baby will be HIV-infected. See Minkoff, Care of Pregnan Women Infected With
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 258 J. Am. Med. A. 2714 (1987).
5. In 1984, 32.3 % of Black women and 26.4 % of Hispanic women lived below the poverty level,
as compared to 11.5 % of white women. Wilson, "Women and Poverty: A Demographic Overview,"
in Women, Health and Poverty 26, (C. Perales & L. Young eds. 1988).
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activity consonant with legislative policy" and "direct state interference with
a protected activity." Maher, 432 U.S. at 475.
Unlike the selective subsidies of childbirth upheld in Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and the selective
allocation of public hospitals and staffs upheld in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052-53 (1989), the Title X regulations seek
to encourage childbirth by affirmatively impairing women's reproductive
choice. Maher and McRae involved refusals to fund abortions,6 not govern-
mental schemes to interfere with a woman's decision making process by withhold-
ing information and providing misinformation. In Reproductive Health Services
v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1080 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit
distinguished Missouri's ban on "encouraging or counseling" abortion from the
restrictions in Maher and McRae, declaring that it could "perceive of few
obstacles more burdensome to the right to decide than a state-imposed blackout
on the information necessary to make a decision. "7 The Title X regulations
present an afortiorari case, for they not only impose a blackout, but they also
compel Title X health care providers to transmit skewed information that will
mislead Title X patients into carrying pregnancies to term.
The Title X regulations are an even more serious interference in the
physician-patient dialogue than were the requirements struck down in City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444
(1983), that compelled health care providers to disseminate information
"designed to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or
childbirth."" The Title X regulations obstruct the decisionmaking process more
6. In Maher, the Court observed that the statute at issue "imposed no restriction on access to
abortions that was not already there." 432 U.S. at 474. Similarly, the Court noted in McRae that the
funding restriction left an indigent woman "with at least the same range of choice in deciding whether
to obtain a[n] . . . abortion as she would have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care
costs at all." 448 U.S. at 317. (emphasis added)
7. The Court did not address the constitutionality of Missouri's ban on counseling in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989). The issue was dismissed as moot because the
State interpreted the restriction as directed not at the conduct of any physician or health care provider,
but only at those responsible for expending funds. Id. at 3053-3054.
8. In Akron, the Court held that by forcing physicians to furnish all their pregnant patients with an
"inflexible list of information," the ordinance "unreasonably.. . placed 'obstacles in the path of the
doctor upon whom [a woman is] entitled to rely for advice in connection with her decision.'" Akron,
462 U.S. at 444--445 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 n.33 (1977)). The Court reasoned that
"full vindication of the woman's fundamental right [to reproductive choice] necessarily requires that her
physician be given 'the room he needs to make his best medical judgment.'" Id. at 427 (quoting Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)). That room includes the physician's discretion to provide her
pregnant patient with information relevant to her particular needs, Id. at 443, when 'both assisting the
woman in the decisionmaking process and implementing her decision should she choose abortion," Id. at
427.
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aggressively than did the Pennsylvania statute struck down in Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
which required physicians to provide their pregnant patients with a description
of fetal development and a list of agencies offering alternatives to abortion.9
Contrary to professional standards that require balanced counseling and
discussion of the full range of options to which a woman is entitled when
pregnancy is diagnosed, see American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, Statement of Policy: Further Ethical Considerations in Induced Abortion
2-3 (Dec. 1977),'o the regulations require Title X health care providers to
direct their counseling solely towards promoting childbirth. Health-related
abortion restrictions that so "depart from accepted medical practice," City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. at 431 & 454
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), as these regulations do, unduly burden a woman's
right to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy.
By censoring information on abortion and compelling referral for prenatal
care, section 59.8 of the regulations will lead many women to believe wrongly
that abortion is not an available option. Some women, especially those who are
uneducated or immigrants from countries where the right to abortion is
restricted, may be prevented from discovering that abortion is legal in the
United States."' Out of fear of incurring their doctor's disapproval or ex-
9. The Court described these requirements as "an outright attempt to wedge Pennsylvania's message
discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed consent dialogue between the woman and her physi-
cian." 7hornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762. The Court acknowledged that even standing alone the list of
prenatal and neonatal care agencies could not pass constitutional muster:
Even the listing of agencies ... presents serious problems: it contains names of agencies that
well may be out of step with the needs of the particular woman and thus places the physician
in an awkward position and infringes upon his or her professional responsibilities. Forcing
the physician or counselor to present the materials and the list to the woman makes him or
her in effect an agent of the State in treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur
upon both the materials and the list. All this is, or comes close to being, state medicine
imposed upon the woman, not the professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially
structures - as it obviously was intended to do - the dialogue between the woman and her
physician.
Id. at 762-63 (citation omitted).
10. See also American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Standards for Obstetric-
Gynecologic Services 57 (6th ed. 1985) ("In the event of an unwanted pregnancy, the physician should
counsel the patient about her options of continuing the pregnancy to term and keeping the infant,
continuing the pregnancy to term and offering the infant for legal adoption, or aborting the pregnancy.")
For a fuller discussion of the ethical issues raised, see Briefs of Amici Curiae of the American Public
Health Association, et al. and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al.
11. See generally C. Tietze & S. Henshaw, Induced Abortion: A World Review (6th ed. 1986). In
fact, ignorance regarding the availability of abortion is pervasive throughout American society. See
National Abortion Rights Action League, Hickman-Maslin Research Poll for American Viewpoint 4
(1987) (36% of American adults believe that abortion is available during the first three months of
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posing themselves to prosecution, many women will be reluctant to break the
silence on abortion and ask about it. The regulations deprive these women of
the opportunity to decide whether or not to continue a pregnancy, for they will
not even realize they have a choice to make.
Those women who know abortion is an option and ask about its availability
must be told only that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
abortion." 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1989). Many women will understand this
message to mean that they have no safe alternative to carrying their pregnancy
to term and that abortion is not appropriate for them. Declaration of Dr. Irving
Rust, Medical Director of the Bronx Center of Planned Parenthood, New York
City, 15 (254JA). If information on the health of their "unborn child" is
the only guidance women receive, they may well feel compelled to carry to
term or to turn to dangerous attempts to self-abort or even to suicide.' 3
Teenage girls, who are often seared, ashamed and alone when faced with
pregnancy, are particularly susceptible to suggestion from their physicians that
abortion is not permissible or available. Declaration of Toni Morgan, 7-8
(219-220 JA).
Even the women who resist the government's censorship attempts, identify
abortion as a safe and legal option, and choose to obtain abortions are harmed
by the increased health risks and costs caused by the delay the regulations
impose on their process of obtaining appropriate health care. See Massachusetts
v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1990)
(en banc). Under the regulations, women who enter Title X facilities with false,
but not unreasonable, expectations of balanced counseling will be referred only
to prenatal clinics-even if they express their desire to terminate their
pregnancy. Though there may be some abortion providers on the list of prena-
tal care providers given them, women will not be able to identify the abortion
providers except by a series of telephone calls or hit or miss visits to several
facilities. This is particularly onerous for low-income women who often lack
access to a car, the fare for other transportation or even a telephone.'
4
Combined with scheduling difficulties, work and child care commitments,
school and transportation problems, this circuitous path to abortion may entail
pregnancy only under "extreme circumstances" or is "not allowed").
12. Even if women are unsure of the meaning of this message, few will ask their doctors for fuller
explanation because all patients are conditioned to "follow doctors' orders" unquestioningly. Katz,
Physician-Patient Encounters "On a Dar*ling Plain", 9 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 207, 215 (1987)
13. Declaration of Dr. Irving Rust 1 11 (2521A), 14-16 (253-54JA).
14. See Nsiah-Jefferson, "Reproductive Laws, Women of Color and Low-Income Women," in
Reproductive Laws for the 1990s 24 (N. Taub & S. Cohen eds. 1988).
1991]
174 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 3:161
delays of days, weeks or even months. Such delays may well push women into
the second trimester of pregnancy, significantly increasing the health risks for
those women who choose abortions.15 For the thousands of teenagers whose
denial, fear, shame and uncertainty often result in a late initial visit to the
clinic, 6 further delay resulting from the regulations can be critical.
In addition to increasing health risks, delay makes abortion more costly 7
and difficult to obtain." This is especially true for low-income women living
in rural areas where abortion providers are scarce and women often have to
travel to another county or even another state to obtain an abortion. " Because
most of the women served by Title X do not have access to alternative health
care, many will learn of affordable abortion clinics only through word of
15. The Court recently acknowledged that an abortion delay of 48 hours to a week or more
'increased the medical risk associated with the abortion procedure to 'a statistically significant degree.'"
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957,4963 (U.S. June 25, 1990) (accepting the finding of the Dis-
trict Court). With each passing week in the second trimester, the risks of major complications from even
a legal abortion increase by approximately 30 percent and the mortality risk by 50 percent. Declaration
of Dr. George Morley 1 12, President of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
(227JA).
16. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4970 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing 1 National Research Council, Risking the Future: Adolescent Sexuality,
Pregnancy and Childbearing 114 (C. Hayes, ed. 1987)).
17. The cost of an abortion increases as pregnancy advances. Clinics charge an average of $231
for an abortion at 8 weeks; $400 at 16 weeks and $700 at 20 weeks. The Alan Guttmacher Institute,
Abortion and Women's Health: A Turning Point for America? 26 (1990). The Court invalidated second
trimester hospitalization requirement in Akron because it imposed "a heavy, and unnecessary, burden,"
more than doubling the cost of "women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and
safe abortion procedure." 462 U.S. at 438.
18. Only 17% of all abortion providers perform abortions after the 16th week of pregnancy.
Henshaw, Forrest, & Van Voort, Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 Fain. Plan.
Persp. 63, 69 (1987).
19. In 1985, 82% of all U.S. counties lacked an abortion provider, yet these counties were home
to 30% of all women of childbearing years. See Henshaw, Forrest, & Van Voort, supra n.18, at 65.
The difficulty in locating an abortion provider is increasing as fewer doctors are willing to perform
abortions for fear of harassment. N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 1. South Dakota and North
Dakota now only have one abortion provider each and in Wyoming, more than 50% of women go out
of state to obtain an abortion. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1990, at A10, col. 5.
20. Even HHS has acknowledged that "[flor many clients, family planning clinics are their only
continuing source of health information and medical care." U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
Program Guidelines for Project Grants for Family Planning Services § 9.4 (1981) (emphasis added).
Few women served by Title X have any health insurance which would enable them to afford private
care. Of all women aged 18-24, almost 30% have no insurance coverage. Tallon & Block, "Changing
Patterns of Health Insurance Coverage; Special Concerns for Women," in Women, Health and Poverty
119, 122 (C. Perales & L. Young eds. 1988). Of all women aged 15-44 living below the poverty level,
36% are uninsured. Id. The rates are worse for women of color: 21.8% of Blacks and 29.1% of
Hispanics are uninsured, compared with 14% of whites. Nsiah-Jefferson, "Reproductive Laws, Women
of Color, and Low-Income Women," in Reproductive Laws for the 1990s 17, 27 n.46. (N. Taub &
S. Cohen eds. 1988). Moreover, "uninsured minorities obtain less physician care and less hospital care,
and travel further and wait longer for care, than white uninsured." Dallek, Health Care for America's
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mouth. In their desperate and frustrated quest to end an unwanted pregnancy
some women will find and turn to illegal abortionists.2 ' For these women,
delay may spell death.22
The regulations will have perhaps their cruelest effect on those low-income
women who have serious complicating conditions, such as hypertension,
eclampsia, diabetes, congenital heart disease, cancer, sickle-cell anemia, kidney
disease and certain respiratory, urinary and neuromuscular disorders.
Continuation of pregnancy for women suffering from these diseases carries
grave risks for the health of both the mother and the fetus.' While the
regulations at issue will permit professionals in Title X clinics to disclose the
existence of complicating conditions to their patients, they will prevent coun-
seling of abortion as an alternative to carrying a pregnancy to term.24 As a re-
sult, women with serious complicating conditions will not learn that their
pregnancies pose substantial health risks that may require an abortion to
preserve their health or save their life. In addition, the regulations' mandated
referral to prenatal care will reinforce the false impression that the pregnancy
does not actually threaten their health.
As a result of the Title X regulations' enforced misinformation, low-
income women who have restricted access to affordable, comprehensive
reproductive health care and counseling will be impermissibly coerced to make
uninformed, and often dangerous, reproductive decisions. For this reason, the
Poor: Separate and Unequal, 20 Clearinghouse Rev. 361, 370 (1986).
21. Recently, Becky Bell, an Indiana high school student, died of a massive infection after she
sought an illegal abortion to avoid disappointing her parents by telling them she was pregnant. Carlson,
Abortion's Hardest Cases, Time, July 9, 1990, at 22.
22. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957, 4970 (U.S. June 25, 1990) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Greydanus & Railsback, Abortion in Adolescence,
1 Seminars in Adolescent Med. 213, 214 (1985) (mortality rate 100 times greater from illegal abortion
than legal one)).
23. For example, diabetes poses serious risks during pregnancy. Pregnancy-induced diabetes occurs
in approximately one to three percent of pregnancies. Medical Complications During Pregnancy 41
(G. Burrow & T. Ferris 3d ed. 1988). In addition, approximately 1.5 million women of childbearing
age are known to have diabetes. Maternal-Fetal Medicine 925 (R. Creasey & R. Resnik 2d ed. 1989).
A pregnant woman with diabetes is four times as likely to develop hypertensive disease; she is also more
likely to develop infections of a greater severity, injure her birth canal during vaginal delivery, require
a caesrian section, and hemorrhage after delivery. Williams Obstetrics 600 (J. Pritchard, P. MacDonald
& N. Grant 17th ed. 1985). See Brief of Amici Curiae of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, et al. for a full discussion of the health risks of pregnancy to women with complicating
medical conditions.
24. See Declaration of Dr. George Morley, President of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 17 (228-29JA); Declaration of Prof. Howard Minkoff, Professor of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, State of New York Health Science Center, 8 (648A); Declaration of Dr. Allan
Rosenfield, Professor of Obstetrics-Gynecology and Public Health, Columbia University School of
Public Health, 22 (83a).
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Title X regulations do more than encourage childbirth over abortion: they
actively interfere with a woman's ability to decide whether to carry a
pregnancy to term.
II. THE REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF LOW-
INCOME WOMEN TO RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS PRACTICING AT TITLE X CLINICS.
The regulations hold the first amendment rights of women and their health
care providers hostage to a funding scheme requiring the dissemination of
inaccurate and distorted information. Through these funding restrictions, the
government has impaired the first amendment right of women to receive
information about their reproductive health.
It is now well established that the first amendment protects the listener's
right to receive information. Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1975); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
As early as its decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the.Court
clarified that, in addition to protecting the freedom to speak, the Constitution
safeguards "opportunities ... to acquire knowledge." Id. at 482. In keeping
with this principle, the Court has struck down a wide variety of government
restrictions that offended the "(f)irst amendment right to receive information
and ideas." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (quoting Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1957); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (19 4 5).'i The reciprocal nature of the right to
receive information derives from the fact that it "is a necessary predicate to the
recipient's meaningful exercise of his own right of speech, press and political
freedom." Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (emphasis in original).'
25. In these cases, the Court has held unconstitutional government attempts to stem the flow of
information in public schools, courts of law, prisons and the mails. The regulations' efforts to suppress
vital medical communications in Title X clinics are surely more reprehensible, given that this "blackout"
not only curtails the sharing of ideas and information critical to our polity but also directly undermines
the health and lives of millions of women.
26. Justice Brennan stated that the listener's right to receive information warrants first amendment
protection because 'the dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees
are not free to receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers
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In this instance, the right to receive information is a necessary predicate
to the constitutionally protected right to reproductive decision making. As the
Court declared in Griswold, the very first case recognizing the protected nature
of the relationship between a patient seeking family planning information and
her physician, "[t]he right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the
right to utter or print, but the. . . right to receive. . .[information]." 381
U.S. at 482Y
Despite the fact that the first amendment "prohibit(s) [the] government
from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw," First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765, 783, reh'g
denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978),8 the regulations withdraw abortion counseling
and referrals in the context of low-income health care from the stock of infor-
mation that millions of women can receive and casts prenatal care and
childbirth as the only option.' Therefore, the Second Circuit's conclusion that
the regulations were not viewpoint-based, because they limited both "pro and
con" advocacy about abortion, New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 414 (2d
Cir. 1989), ignored the regulations' obvious intent actively to interfere with a
woman's decision whether or not to carry her pregnancy to term. As the First
Circuit correctly observed,
It is naive to assert that not talking about abortion to a pregnant
woman when discussing her options is value neutral. . . . By
discussing only what is best for the unborn child, the counselor has
already made the woman's choice. The Government, in restricting the
counselor's options to that choice, enforces its choice.
Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 72
(1st Cir. 1990) (en banc).' By prohibiting a woman from receiving abortion-
related information, the regulations violate the Court's admonition, in another
and no buyers." Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. Justice White has written that "[t]he self-expression of the communicator is not the only value
encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to as the right to hear or
receive information, is to protect the interchange of ideas. Any communication of ideas. . . furthers
the purposes of the first amendment." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 806,
reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
28. See also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482 (the government "may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge").
29. Note, The 7itle X Family Planning Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional
Rights? 41 Stan. L. Rev. 401, 402 (1989).
30. For a fuller discussion of the regulations' unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of
viewpoint in a public forum, see Brief of Amici Curiae the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, et al.
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first amendment context, that "[i]f there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies . . . the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence." Linmark Assoc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring)).
Protecting the dissemination of full and accurate medical information from
governmental interference is vital. Such information is critical and is already
of limited supply, especially to low-income women.3' The pervasive nature
of government regulation of medicine designed to protect the public through
ensuring the quality of medical counseling, demonstrates the crucial importance
of complete and accurate medical information to our society.32 All states
require that a license be obtained before a doctor can practice medicine and
licensing is contingent upon completion of extensive education and training.33
In addition, many doctors choose to develop specializations which restrict the
availability of specific medical information even further, to a limited few in a
given field.' While such efforts are intended to improve the quality of
medical counseling, they also impose costs that necessarily restrict its
availability.
35
31. Numerous studies and reports have noted increasing deterioration in access to health care
services for low-income groups. See, e.g., L.A. Times, July 17, 1990, at Al, col. 5. (noting that the
United States infant mortality rate - a prime indicator of the nation's health care access - exceeds 10
per 1,000, placing the United States no better than 20th out of 22 industrial nations in a United Nations
survey); Hatlie, Professional Liability: 7he Case for Federal Reform, 263 J. Am. Med. A. 586 (1990)
(reporting increased diminution in the availability of health care in the United States and noting that
.access problems are most pronounced in the maternal health field").
32. Public health and the practice of medicine are highly regulated by both the state and federal
government, including the licensing of health care providers, facility construction, antitrust matters and
environmental protection and the development and distribution of drugs. See generally Health Care
Sourcebook,A Compendium of Federal Laws, Regulations and Documents Relating to Health Law, vols.
1 & 2 (W. Miller ed. 1989).
33. G. Annas, The Rights of Patients 252 (2d ed. 1989). Typically, a doctor is required to complete
four years of undergraduate education, four years of medical school and four years of clinical education
as a resident.
34. If a doctor chooses to specialize in a particular area of medicine, two or more years of
additional training are necessary, and certification by a specialty board is required by most institutions.
AMA Council on Medical Education, Future Directions for Medical Education, 248 J. Am. Med. A.
3225 (1982). See also AMA Council on Long Range Planning and Development, The Future of General
Internal Medicine, 262 J. Am. Med. A. 2119 (1989) (number of primary health care specialists declin-
ing rapidly as more doctors are choosing specialization over becoming a general internist, because of
higher pay and status).
35. The government's control over the practice of medicine also extends to the criminalization of
the unauthorized practice of medicine. See, e.g., Pinkus v. MacMahon, 129 N.J. 367, 29 A.2d 885
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1943) (owner of a food store engaged in authorized practice of medicine when he
diagnosed shoppers' illnesses, prescribed a healthful diet and sold certain vitamins which he claimed had
a curative effect); New York v. Varas, 110 A.D.2d 646 (2d Dept. 1985) (engaged in unauthorized
Rust v. Sullivan
Over the past twenty years, the federal government has encouraged low-
income women and the health facilities in their communities to rely on Title X
to support affordable, quality reproductive health care, including abortion
counseling and referral. To a large extent, Title X funding has displaced state
and local government aid and private funding36. Thus, by preventing Title X
health care workers from providing their patients with comprehensive and accu-
rate health information about the option of abortion-despite its importance and
limited availability-the government effectively places it beyond the reach of
most, if not all, Title X patients. For Title X patients, medical advice about the
"denied idea" of the option of abortion is not "readily available from the same
source in other accessible locations," Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 913 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and will be effectively foreclosed
by the federal government.
Enhanced and improved medical information through government
regulation is not the only factor defining the health care culture in the United
States. The governing principles of medical ethics nationwide require that
physicians communicate to the patient full information about her medical
condition and treatment alternatives to ensure that the patient participates
meaningfully in her treatment decisions.' This is premised on the view that
such an approach results in the best medical decisions.
It is unreasonable, in the context of this medical culture to expect a woman
who uses a Title X clinic to anticipate the forfeiture of full health care counsel-
ing and her own informed decision making when she walks through the Title
X clinic doors. Indeed, one of the many apparent dangers of the regulations is
that women entering Title X clinics are not warned that they are about to re-
ceive distorted, misleading information unrelated to their individual health
needs. Moreover, even if formal warning notices were somehow provided to
Title X patients, it would be unreasonable to expect that a Title X patient, or
any patient, would meaningfully alter her expectation of the physician-patient
relationship to accommodate any disclaimer stating that the clinic cannot
mention abortion.3"
practice of medicine where the defendant never obtained a license to practice and conducted medical
examinations, wrote prescriptions and provided diagnoses).
36. Approximately fifty percent of Title X projects' funding comes from federal sources, with the
remaining ten percent generated by Medicaid and sliding scale fee payments. See Massachusetts v.
Secretary of Health and Human Services, 899 F.2d 53, 55-56 (1st Cit. 1990) (en banc).
37. See, e.g., American Medical Association, Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association 8.07, at 31-32 (1989); Centerbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 164 (1972).
38. The element of trust and full reliance is crucial within the context of a physician-patient
relationship. 'The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, and ordinarily has
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The dangers of the government's censorship campaign become readily
apparent when one hypothesizes a situation where the government enacts a
regulation prohibiting oncologists in federally funded hospitals from counseling
cancer patients about the treatment option of chemotherapy, while mandating
referrals to facilities which primarily practice holistic medicine. Patients
suffering from cancer would either be left unaware of the existence of
chemotherapy, or be given the misleading message that chemotherapy was not
a medically acceptable treatment option for many forms of cancer-in either
case unable to make a fully informed treatment decision.
Thus, the government's censorship of abortion information infringes the
most basic first amendment rights of patients of Title X facilities and ignores
the Court's admonition that "people will perceive their own best interests only
if they are well informed . . . the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them." Virginia Pharmacy
Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1975).
II1. THE REGULATIONS DEPRIVE WOMEN OF EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE
LAW BECAUSE THEY DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF GENDER AND
UNDULY BURDEN A WOMAN'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.
The regulations contravene the fourteenth amendment's prohibition on
discrimination because they exclusively harm women. As a result of the
regulations, women are denied important medical information necessary to
make an informed decision about contraception or, if pregnant, about whether
to continue a pregnancy. For example, a woman suffering from severe
hypertension should be advised by her Title X physician both that the use of
oral contraceptives is contraindicated and that pregnancy may threaten her life.
The Title X physician would be precluded from fully informing her patient that
barrier methods of contraception, with early abortion as a backup if the barrier
only [her] physician to whom [she] can look for enlightenment with which to reach an intelligent
decision." Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (D.C. Cir.
1972). Thus a patient relies on her doctor for the accurate, complete and unbiased information she needs
to make decisions about her health. See Affidavit of Dr. Jay Katz, Professor of Law and Psychoanalysis,
Yale University, J1 7-8 (207JA):
The doctor-patient relationship is based on trust . . . it is recognized by law as a fiduciary
relationship. Because patients must be able to rely on their physicians to act in good faith and in
their best interest, principles of law and ethics require them to do so.
The physician thus has an obligation to be truthful, to respect the rights of the patient, and to
disclose to the patient all pertinent facts regarding the patient's condition and treatment options including
the risks and benefits of each.
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method fails, are the safest type of contraception.
3
Women, pregnant and non-pregnant, are the only people directly burdened
by the Title X regulations.' Moreover, this gender-based burden curtails
women's fundamental constitutional rights: a woman's fundamental privacy
right to terminate a pregnancy and her first amendment right to receive
information."
The Court has held that measures classifying on the basis of gender are
unconstitutional unless the party supporting the measure can "carry the burden
of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification."
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (quoting
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981)). See also Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197-199 (1976). Classifications based on gender have long been
subjected to searching analysis because of the substantial burdens suffered by
women when gender stereotypes are imposed on them. See Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women, 458 U.S. at 726; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 211
(1977) (plurality opinion); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion). The Title X
regulations impair a woman's constitutionally guaranteed liberty and autonomy
by the pernicious strategy of keeping all necessary information from her. This
39. See Tietze, Bongaarts & Schearer, Mortality Associated with the Control of Fertility, 8 Fain.
Plan. Persap. 6 (1976); The Alan Gutimacher Institute, Making Choices-Evaluating the Health Risks
and Benefits of Birth Control Methods (1983). The Food and Drug Administration requires manufac-
turers of intrauterine devices ("I.U.D.'s") to inform physicians that if a woman becomes pregnant with
an I.U.D. in place, and removal is difficult, "termination of the pregnancy should be considered and
offered the patient as an option . . ." 21 C.F.R. § 310.502(b)(1) (1989). Similarly, a woman who
becomes pregnant while using oral contraceptives, "should be apprised of the potential risks to the fetus:
the advisability of continuing the pregnancy in light of these risks should be discussed." K. Fineberg,
J. Peters, J. Willson & D. Kroll, Obstetrics/Gynecology and the Law, 311 (1984).
40. Because this case involves placing affirmative burdens on all women's constitutional rights,
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), is not controlling. Gedudig sustained the constitutionality of
a state disability insurance program that excluded from coverage certain disabilities resulting from preg-
nancy because the group discriminated against included only pregnant women and not all women.
The program upheld in Geduldig is also distinguishable from the regulations at issue because it
refused to extend to women a benefit that men could not receive. The Court has established a distinction
between "merely refus[ing] to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive," and
"impos[ing] on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer." Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136, 142 (1977) (deeming exclusion of pregnant employees sex discrimination under Title VII).
Thus, even where a law places affirmative burdens on pregnant women alone, Geduldig has no force.
See also Estrich and Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One, 138 U. Penn. L. Rev.
119, 124 n.10 (1989).
41. Since the regulations discriminate against women in a way that infringes upon their fundamental
rights, the regulations violate the equal protection clause and must be subjected to strict scrutiny. See
infra at p. 25 and note 49.
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strategy of misinformation, justified by the goal of "promoting childbirth,""
effectively reinvents the outmoded and dangerous notion that a woman's proper
function is reproduction.4 3 The Court has consistently struck down legislation
that perpetuates "fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females," Mississippi University for Women, 458 U.S. at 726, even when their
impact has been far less onerous than the effects of these regulations.'
Not only do the regulations impermissibly perpetuate stereotypes about a
woman's proper role in society, they also deprive women of equal treatment
with respect to the exercise of their fundamental right to privacy. All persons
possess a right to privacy protecting certain personal decisions regarding
marriage and family life from unwarranted governmental interference.4 5 For
a woman, this right includes the right to decide whether or not to terminate a
pregnancy, with the chance to determine what is best for her given her
physical," emotional, economic, educational and family circumstances. In
fact, this Court has recognized a woman's right to choose an abortion by
striking down a regulation that would have required spousal consent because
42. If the regulations are allowed to stand, a day may come when the government decides to impose
burdens on men as well in the interest of "promoting childbirth." For example, the government may
decide to mislead men, or withhold information altogether, about contraception so that a sexually active
man might father more children.
43. Women have long been perceived as persons whose 'paramount destiny and mission... [is]
to fulfill the noble and benign office of wife and mother." Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 142 (1873)
(Bradwell, J., concurring). People who would restrict women's access to abortion echo the views of
Justice Bradley and believe that the only appropriate roles for women are those of mother and
housewife. See Estrich & Sullivan supra note 40, at 152-53.
44. The Court has struck down: sex-based distinctions determining eligibility for survivors benefits
under the Social Security Act, Ca/ifano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); sex-based admission
requirements for enrollments in nursing school, Mississippi Universiy for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718 (1982); sex-based regulations determining quarters and medical allowances, Froniero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); sex-based regulations establishing different drinking ages for men and
women, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); and sex-based regulations determining government
benefits, Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). None of these regulations actually interfered
with a woman's constitutional rights much less jeopardized her health or life.
45. The freedom of personal choice implicit in the concept of constitutional liberty places beyond
the intrusive reach of the government the decision to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); the
decision of when and whether to bear children, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and
decisions regarding childrearing and education, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The freedom to choose the structure of one's family is deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977).
46. Over the nine months of pregnancy, a woman's uterus increases 500 to 1,000 times in size,
displacing other bodily organs including the heart, appendix and gastrointestinal tract; her resting pulse
rate quickens by ten to fifteen beats per minute and her heart may increase slightly in size; and her body
weight increases by an average of twenty-five pounds. Even a healthy pregnant woman may experience
nausea, vomiting, more frequent urination, back pain, fatigue, insomnia, labored breathing and water
retention. See Williams Obstetrics 540-42 (P. MacDonald, J. Pritchard & N. Grant 17th ed. 1985).
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"it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly
and immediately affected by the pregnancy...." Planned Parenthood of
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
No regulation in the Title X context infringes on men's privacy rights in
a way that is comparable to the regulations' ban of any information about
abortion to women.47 Similarly, men face no obstacles to their first amend-
ment right to receive medical information critical to decisions regarding their
bodies or health. The regulations create two categories of doctor-patient
relationships, one which presumptively allows men to receive full medical
information and the other which deprives only women from obtaining complete
and accurate information about their health.4 This type of governmental dis-
crimination clearly violates the equal protection clause.
IV. THE TITLE X REGULATIONS AT ISSUE HERE CANNOT SURVIVE STRICT
SCRUTINY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT LACKS A COMPELLING INTEREST
AND THE REGULATIONS ARE NOT NARROWLY TAILORED TO SERVE ANY
INTEREST.
The Title X regulations directly interfere with fundamental privacy and
first amendment rights of women. Moreover, because the regulations
exclusively harm women by burdening their fundamental rights, they also
deprive women of equal protection under the law. The Title X regulations
cannot survive strict scrutiny because the government can assert no "compel-
ling interest" to justify the burdens placed on women's privacy and first
amendment rights by the regulations, or their denial of equal protection.
In order to safeguard the individual against the invasive power of
government, the Court turns its most "searching judicial inquiry" to govern-
mental regulation that intrudes on the fundamental rights of its citizens. City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989). Thus, the Court
has consistently applied strict scrutiny whenever a woman's privacy right to
choose abortion is encumbered by substantial burdens. See Hodgson v.
47. Recipients of Title X funds provide family planning services to both men and women. Services
for men can include sterilization, sexually transmitted disease screening and treatment, condom
distribution and general information. See Danielson & McNally, ile X and Family Planning Services
for Men, 20 Fain. Plan. Persp. 234 (1988).
48. This is not a case of disproportionate impact but of exclusive impact because women are the
only ones who are affected by the Title X regulations. In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979), by contrast, the veterans' preference upheld by this Court disadvantaged a class comprised
of both men and women although the classification disproportionately disadvantaged women. The class
affected by the regulations at issue is defined by a biological correlate of gender unlike Feeney where
the class granted veterans' benefits also consisted of women.
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Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957, 4969 (U.S. June 25, 1990) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The
Court has also consistently applied strict scrutiny whenever the government
intrudes on the first amendment right to receive information. Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 482.' In addition, strict scrutiny applies whenever
legislation places burdens on a fundamental right in violation of the equal
protection clause. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The central purpose of this "searching judicial inquiry," Croson, 109 S.
Ct. at 721, into governmental actions that infringe upon constitutionally
protected rights and groups is to ensure that such actions serve a stated goal or
interest of sufficient importance to justify infringement and that the means
chosen to effect the goal are closely tailored to serve only the state interest with
minimum intrusion upon the individual's protected rights. The regulations at
issue here fail in both respects.
First, the overriding governmental purpose for Title X is to promote public
health through the provision of family planning services for low-income
clients-a compelling interest. The regulations at issue here also serve the
ancillary purpose of encouraging childbirth over abortion. The government
seeks to achieve this ancillary goal, however, not simply by providing
incentives to childbirth but rather by perpetuating ignorance and denying
women information about abortion as a safe, legal alternative to childbirth. In
effect, the regulations' purported purpose of promoting childbirth is a pretext
49. Similarly the Court applies strict scrutiny to other violations of free speech, including
discrimination on the basis of viewpoint, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84
(1984), and conditioning federal funding on the relinquishment of first amendment rights to free
expression, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963).
50. In enacting Title X, Congress intended to establish a program that would provide the poor with
comprehensive reproductive health care. During the floor debate in the House, then-Representative
George Bush stated, "[m]ost important is that this legislation be recognized. . . as a health care service
mechanism. .. " 116 Cong. Rec. H37370 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1970) (statement of Rep. Bush). The
statutory mandate of Title X is expansive:
to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall
offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services
(including natural family planning methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents).
42 U.S.C. § 300(a) (1982). For a complete discussion of the purpose of Title X, see Brief of Petitioner
State of New York, etat. and Brief ofAmic, Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
et al.
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for the actual purpose of the regulationsSl-direct interference in the funda-
mental privacy and first amendment rights of women to make fully informed
decisions between abortion and childbirth.52
Second, the government's means of banning abortion counseling and
mandating referral to prenatal care are not narrowly tailored to serve the goal
of encouraging childbirth without impermissibly violating the free speech and
privacy rights of women served by Title X programs. The regulations clearly
conflict with medical ethics that demand unrestricted communication between
a physician and her patient.53 The government's asserted interest here does
not justify the enactment of health regulations that "depart from accepted
medical practice," City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. at 431 & 454 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Rather than being
narrowly tailored to encourage childbirth over abortion, the regulations distort
the physician-patient dialogue in a way that fundamentally impedes the patient's
receipt of viewpoint neutral information and her autonomy in reproductive
decision making.
Finally, the Title X regulations also fail to pass muster under the Court's
most lenient standard of review, the rational basis standard. As the Court re-
cently reiterated in Hodgson, under any analysis, an abortion regulation "can-
not be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are not reasonably related to
legitimate state interests." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4962 (cita-
51. At least one member of this Court has advocated searching scrutiny of the government's stated
purposes as well as the means to achieve those purposes. In Mississippi Univeriy For Women v.
Hogan, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "the mere recitation of a benign . . . purpose is not an
automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme." 458 U.S. 718,728 (1982) (quoting Weinbergerv. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
Similarly, in a first amendment context, Justice O'Connor also suggested that strict scrutiny applies
whenever burdens on speech are imposed on the pretext of furthering some general legislative interest:
"fi]f. . . a city were to use a nuisance statute as a pretext for closing down a bookstore because it sold
indecent books . . . the case would clearly implicate first amendment concerns and require analysis
under the appropriate first amendment standard of review." Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697,
708 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor recently observed that the requirement of narrowly tailored regulation is
"designed to 'ensur[e] that the means chosen fit' [the] compelling goal so closely that there is little or
no possibility that the motive" for a regulatory scheme is illegitimate or unconstitutional. Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 58 U.S.L.W. 5053, 5072 (U.S. June 27, 1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoting Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 493).
52. As this Court pointed out in Hodgson, "[a] State's value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion may provide adequate support for decisions involving [the] allocation of public funds, but not
for simply substituting a state decision for an individual decision that a woman has a right to make for
herself. Otherwise the interest in liberty protected by the due process clause would be a nullity."
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957, 4962 (U.S. June 25, 1990).
53. For a complete discussion of this point, see Brief of Amici Curiae of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, et al.
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tions omitted). Because the effect of the regulations' ban on abortion counseling
and referral is seriously to endanger maternal health, the regulations' goal of
promoting childbirth actually undercuts Title X's overarching public health
purpose in a manner that violates medically accepted practice. Any regulation
which so clearly departs from commonly accepted medical ethics and practice
cannot be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in promoting health and
cannot be saved simply because it serves some ancillary purpose.
By analogy, suppose perceiving a serious threat of overpopulation, the
government opted to respond to the crisis by limiting population growth
through a program of male sterilization. A federal program of forced steriliz-
ation of men would violate a man's right to decide whether or not to have
children, and would necessarily be struck down by the Court on privacy and
equal protection grounds. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). However, a government program
providing federal funding of the full cost of male sterilizations (but not funding
male fertility treatment) and establishing population control clinics for the
performance of sterilization on demand would be a possible alternative under
prevailing constitutional doctrine. Cf. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Hypothesize further that an illness
breaks out which causes sterility in men only, but can be cured if diagnosed
and treated promptly. To further promote population control, the government
enacts regulations which prohibit health care professionals in federally funded
facilities from counseling men with the illness about its treatment. In this
hypothetical, the legitimate goal of promoting population control is pursued by
a means which violates an individual's fundamental rights and is a pretext for
the unconstitutional purpose of denying men their right to choose whether or
not to have children.
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CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully urge that the regulations should be invalidated as an
impermissible "effort to deter a woman from making a decision that, with her
physician, is hers to make." Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 899 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (quoting Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986)). For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should strike down the Title
X regulations as unconstitutional.

















New York, New York 10022
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
1991]

